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It was principally through Antun Gustav Matoš (1873–1914) that Croatian literature 
received its modernity for the twentieth century, as well as its sense of Europeanness. 
His essay on Emerson (1904–5) can be analyzed as part of the same agenda, especial-
ly in view of its marked Nietzschean overtones; it is Nietzsche’s Emerson that Matoš 
brings to Croatian culture and, with it, a corresponding in"ection of both Europe 
and philosophy. While this suggests that a Nietzschean America comes to shape the 
American phantasm for twentieth-century Croatian modernity, I propose to discuss 
another operation which is equally critical to this placement of Emerson: the way in 
which Austro-Hungarian cultural practices, de#nitive to Croatia at the time and at 
work in Matoš, decide Emerson’s pro#le and refract some of its Nietzschean features.
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It was principally through Antun Gustav Matoš that Croatian literature re-
ceived its modernity for the twentieth century, as well as its sense of Europe-
anness.1 In 1904 and 1905, while living in Paris, he published two versions of 
an essay on Emerson, one in Serbia and one in Croatia: two years, he writes, 
a$er North America, along with the rest of the world, celebrated the centena-
ry of Emerson’s birth. %is, however, is not to say that he writes “post festum, 
1  A slightly di&erent version of this essay was published in Croatian as “Matošev Emer-
son, ili konzekvencije "anerizma” in Mjesto, granica, identitet. Prostor u hrvatskoj književnosti 
i kulturi (ed. Lana Molvarec), Zagrebačka slavistička škola, Zagreb, 2014, 67-80. All transla-
tions from Matoš are mine. 
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a$er the fact, because writing about minds like that is never too late or too 
early” (Matoš 1973: 41).
%is is evidently of critical interest to Matoš, because he opens the es-
say with the above remark: he begins by emphasizing that both he and Em-
erson are #gures of a certain counter-historical contemporaneity, of untime-
liness. It is here already that Matoš’s approach to Emerson is reminiscent of 
Nietzsche, especially of his Untimely Meditations (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtun-
gen). In Untimely Meditations, time is not that of history or of historicizing. It 
is untimely speci#cally where it imparts a sense of contemporaneity, a sense 
of time in layers and from within faultlines, a time-with, time which is plural 
to begin with, time inconceivable without an addition or else from within an 
addition. A$er all, Matoš invokes Nietzsche explicitly when he says that no 
nineteenth-century scholar is so “menschlicher, allzumenschlicher” as Emer-
son (1973: 41).
%is in turn re"ects the position of critical importance to Nietzsche 
himself, because Nietzsche too privileges Emerson as a scene of instruction. 
Untimely Meditations is a case in point here, especially the essay “Schopen-
hauer as Educator” (“Schopenhauer als Erzieher”). Nietzsche, that is, fore-
grounds Schopenhauer as educator of culture and philosophy, but is given to 
quoting from Emerson in the most critical of positions – especially from “Cir-
cles.” One could therefore argue that Emerson is the true educator of culture 
and philosophy in Nietzsche, as well as the #gure of the very untimeliness 
which to Nietzsche is constituent.2
Matoš imagines Emerson as an expanse of thought which does not al-
low for homogenizing. Consequently, it is the thought itself of expanse and 
expansion: it is the thought which is de#ned by mobilization, movement and 
spreading out. According to Matoš, “Emerson is not to be forced into any of 
the schools of philosophy” and “one could not imagine spirits more di&er-
2  In his 1910 essay on Nietzsche, Matoš insists that Emerson was of critical importance 
to the German philosopher and claims that reading Emerson was instrumental to Ni-
etzsche’s recovery “from melancholia” in 1874: it was at that time, Matoš emphasizes, that 
Nietzsche completed “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1973: 110).
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ent than Emerson is from Hegel”; it is “for this very reason that the scholar 
from Concord is the program of the young America” (1973: 42–43). %is is 
also why Matoš insists that Emersonian thought is wide and universal, pre-
cisely where it is not original or systematic. In other words, it is the kind of 
thought, or rather the type of rationality, which demands that universality 
be approached in terms of microphysics, as a kind of capillary motion. One 
could almost say that Emerson in Matoš is to map out a position where math-
ematism is to give way to microphysics, also where metaphor is to give way to 
metonymy. In turn, microphysics and metonymy are to be seen not merely as 
an indication of universality, but – surprisingly perhaps – as an indication of 
the very logic of universalism.
As a result, America emerges in Matoš as a scene of this metonymic 
rationality, of microphysics, of mobilization at its purest. At the same time, 
this is to say that America makes sense as a scene of universalism, or else that 
America makes no sense if not as a scene of universalism. It is in this way 
that Matoš’s Emerson points in fact to America as imagined and constituted 
by its founding fathers, primarily by %omas Je&erson. I would like to quote 
from Hannah Arendt, who claims that the very idea of America depends on 
the Je&ersonian accent on the new continent and the new man. According 
to Arendt, the new continent is what it takes for the new man, because the 
new continent secures the unrestrained freedom of movement, a kind of un-
conditional mobility (2006: 14–15). Arendt privileges this mobility; indeed, 
it is in this unconditional mobility that she situates the raison itself of the 
American Revolution: not merely its reason, but also the rationality speci#c 
to it. What is more, Arendt claims that this is why European revolutions nev-
er quite came close to the conceptual purity of the American revolutionary 
blueprint: because no continental revolution ever relinquished the notion of 
the nation-state. One could propose, therefore, that Arendt’s perspective on 
the Je&ersonian accent reads in fact as a study of metonymy, with metonymy 
as the logic of the revolution, as well as the logic of the very political project 
of America.
In Matoš, what de#nes Emerson as truly American is precisely the re-
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lation which he forges between freedom and movement, freedom as move-
ment. According to Matoš, there is “something free” in Emerson, something 
“unrestrained and truly American” (1973: 41). %is therefore constitutes the 
truth of America, an American truth, a truth which one cannot approach in 
any other way or position. Which is then also how Matoš maps out the posi-
tion where Je&ersonian America, as a political project, is to become the priv-
ileged destination of philosophy.
Also – it is not so much that there is something free in Emerson but 
that Emerson has that something which is free, unrestrained and truly Amer-
ican. “Nešto slobodno, nevezano i doista amerikansko ima taj pisac,” writes 
Matoš (1973: 41, emphasis mine). Having that something which is free, un-
restrained and truly American secures Emerson as a scholar, although it evi-
dently cannot secure his subjectivity – only his labor, the labor of thought. It 
is the kind of labor which appears to imperil the maintenance of subjectivity, 
or else subjectivity perceived in terms of maintenance. So there is a political 
economy to Emerson which is not to be separated from psychic economy; it 
is a small wonder that Stanley Cavell, for instance, tends to analyze Emerson 
alongside Freud and psychoanalysis. If this means that an American scholar, 
or an American economist, or simply an American, is more or less insane, 
Emerson – as quoted in Matoš – replies that whoever lives for gain alone is 
a beggar (1973: 43). In the wake of this thought, Matoš quotes two more 
sentences from Emerson, now also as a kind of instruction for understanding 
Croatia, in Austria-Hungary, in 1905. %e #rst one is that the interest of his-
tory lies in the destiny of the poor. %e second is that, similarly to Ruskin and 
Tolstoy later, Emerson thought that people, scholars included, are incom-
plete unless well acquainted with cra$smanship and economy (1973: 43).
Cavell sheds light on this proposition in Pursuits of Happiness, when 
he analyzes the luxury and leisure of the Hollywood comedies produced in 
the 1930s, during the Great Depression. According to Cavell, Emerson best 
explains how luxury in these comedies should be grasped, the line of reason-
ing to be found in his essay “History”: “It is remarkable that involuntarily 
we always read as superior beings… We honor the rich because they have 
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externally the freedom, power and grace which we feel to be proper to man, 
proper to us. So all that is said of the wise man by Stoic or Oriental or modern 
essayist, describes his una+ained but a+ainable self ” (Cavell 1981: 5). 
%is is the context in which to interpret a strong claim that Matoš 
makes in his 1904 essay on Andrew Carnegie, the American industrialist 
and philanthropist (and another essay where Emerson features as a thinker 
important to Matoš). Matoš thinks highly of Carnegie and champions him 
as the role model for Croatia. Yet he critiques Carnegie’s statement that the 
cause of the downfall of great nations is not hardship and poverty but luxury 
and corruption. In Croatia, we know how to be both destitute and corrupt, 
and the corrupt poor are worse by far than the corrupt rich, says Matoš in the 
conclusion of his essay (1973: 40). 
While the above sentence may read as rash and callous, it actually con-
tains a suggestion similar to the one that Cavell detects in Emerson: that the 
poor are corrupt when they accept wealth as a value in itself, instead of see-
ing it as but a tool of political pedagogy, or else as a tool for working toward 
an una+ained but a+ainable self (which Cavell proceeds to identify as moral 
perfectionism).3 It is in this light that one should understand the most critical 
sentence of Matoš’s Emerson: “One day we will learn how to replace politics 
with education” (1973: 43).4
Croatia here is evidently symptomatic of Austria-Hungary, of which 
it was part at the time: because Carnegie as quoted by Matoš speaks about 
the downfall of great countries. Austria-Hungary is in this way compared 
to America, with America as a scene of instruction for Austria-Hungary. 
While this too may seem unexpected, particularly in view of the fact that 
Austria-Hungary was a monarchy and the United States a republic, so that 
their very constitutions appear to be beyond comparison, the comparison 
3  See also Cavell 1988.
4  Matoš uses the word odgoj in the above sentence to indicate education, pedagogy and 
upbringing alike. However, seeing that he translated Nietzsche’s “Schopenhauer as Edu-
cator” as “Schopenhauer kao odgojitelj” (1973: 110), I have decided to translate his odgoj 
here as education. 
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nevertheless reveals important facets of both. Austria-Hungary, that is, was 
indeed of a speci#c political constitution, insofar as it was founded in 1867 
as a so called personal union of the dual monarchy of Austria and Hunga-
ry: it was a relatively loose political collective which at all times kept nego-
tiating the very grounds of collectivity and collectability. One could say that 
Austria-Hungary was indeed a great country, but only thanks to the fact that 
it kept questioning the very reason of the state – raison d’État – as well as 
its conditions. Similarly, it was not until a$er the Civil War that the Unit-
ed States of America gave way to signi#cant centralization; it was only with 
the Lincoln administration that the States themselves were no longer a rela-
tively loose political collective. As a result, raison d’État in Austria-Hungary 
was markedly divorced from a uni#ed imaginary of territory or territoriality, 
now as a kind of pure reason of the state which occupies an empty place, a 
no-place, a position which is assigned to metaphor and comparable to where 
psychoanalysis situates the law. In turn, the idea of territory and territoriality 
in Austria-Hungary, thus exempted from metaphor, persisted in the imagi-
nary one could associate with metonymy, capillarity and microphysics. So, 
while the reason of the state, as well as the law, was decided in the domain of 
metaphor (with Ka/a’s narratives as a case in point), the idea of territory in 
Austria-Hungary remained singularly encumbered with a kind of metonymic 
surplus, which was promising to mobilize and revolutionize the body politic 
precisely to the extent to which metonymy does not share its constitution 
with metaphor, law and the reason of the state. %is then is the position from 
where to grasp the fact that both Matoš and, later, Miroslav Krleža privilege 
the peasantry, as collectives a+ached to locality and territoriality, to indicate 
the revolutionary potential: this always happens where metonymy represents 
the peasants be+er than metaphor and where metaphor perhaps cannot rep-
resent the peasants to begin with.
It is certainly symptomatic that Matoš’s and Krleža’s representations 
of Croatian peasants in Austria-Hungary correspond to how Viktor Tausk, 
Freud’s disciple and the military doctor in the First World War, describes the 
peasant recruits. According to Tausk, peasants in the Austrian-Hungarian 
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Army are incompatible with military discipline, which is based on an abso-
lute, pure value of command and authority divorced from the idea of locality; 
peasants, on the other hand, cling to the imaginary of locality and territorial-
ity.5 Symptomatically, Tausk describes the peasants as somewhat impervious 
to psychoanalysis, too, which suggests that the authority fundamental to the 
Austrian-Hungarian Army (in the conditions of a world war) corresponds to 
how psychoanalysis imagines the symbolic sphere (of law and language). Fi-
nally, Tausk’s remarks correspond to how Karl Marx analyzes peasants in “%e 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon”: Marx excludes the peasants from 
political self-representation, arguing that they cannot represent themselves.6 
If this suggests that there may be a "aw in Marx’s thinking of the revolution 
(since most of the successful communist revolutions in the twentieth cen-
tury took place in predominantly agricultural societies – Russia, Yugoslavia, 
China, Cuba, Vietnam...), it equally suggests that Marx, like Tausk, excludes 
peasants from the domain of metaphor and from the metaphoric principle.  
Insofar as Marx’s "aw in thinking the revolution concerns his elision 
of the peasantry, it also suggests that Marx failed to take into account, ful-
ly, the lesson of the American Revolution, speci#cally its raison, which was 
deeply impressed by Je&erson’s constitutional appreciation of agriculture 
and by what was Lucretian and Epicurean about this appreciation. In other 
words, Marx’s "aw should be located not merely in his shedding of peasants 
but equally in his failure to understand Je&erson; a failure all the more telling 
in view of the fact that Marx formed as a philosopher in an elaborate account 
of the Epicurean reworking of Democritus’ physics – precisely the match for 
what is unmistakably Lucretian in Je&erson’s political logic.7 It is almost as if 
5  See Tausk 1991: 158, 160-161.
6  See Marx 1960: 198-199. Among other things, in these paragraphs Marx compares 
peasants to a sack of potatoes: an image which implies that peasant collectives are constitut-
ed around metonymic relations. Its derogatory angle suggests that Marx critiques precisely 
the metonymic character of these collectives or else metonymy as the apparatus of political 
reasoning. 
7  %e title of Marx’s doctoral dissertation was Di#erenz der demokritischen und epi-
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Marx had somewhat repressed his own Epicurean beginnings when he later 
embarked on his critique of the political economy of capitalism, a repression 
whose impact on his theorizing of revolution would turn out to be truly Oe-
dipal. In turn, this American dimension of revolution keeps surfacing in the 
Austro-Hungarian imaginary, particularly aptly in Matoš’s discussion of Em-
erson, for instance. A$er all, Gilles Deleuze also singles out the American and 
the Austro-Hungarian imaginaries as peculiarly revolutionary, thereby imply-
ing an unacknowledged (philosophical?) a=nity of the two.8 %is is an a=ni-
ty which could be traced perhaps to a common interest in physics (of classical 
antiquity), rather than to mathematics; what ensues is a speci#c thinking of 
universalism based in metonymy, not metaphor.9 
So there is a logic to the Austro-Hungarian imaginary which sits well 
with Je&ersonian and Emersonian America; #nally, the political cultures in 
both depend on a rather fundamental tension between law and contract. 
Furthermore, Austria-Hungary forms in 1867 as a relatively loose political 
collective just as other German countries are unifying and homogenizing. 
Austria-Hungary remains outside of this process of uni#cation and homoge-
nization, only to deconstruct its Germanicity into a script of minoritarianism. 
It is a Deleuzian minoritarianism: what is important is not so much the fact 
that Austria-Hungary was characterized by a large number of so-called small 
or minor languages in opposition to German, but rather that German per-
sisted in Austria-Hungary in the zones of indeterminacy and undecidability 
so that ultimately any single, pure language was to be perceived as foreign.10 
kureischen Naturphilosophie. See Dolar 2014 for a detailed reading of Marx’s dissertation, 
especially in relation to Hegel. 
8  For privileging the American and the Austro-Hungarian imaginaries as peculiarly 
revolutionary, see Deleuze 1967 and 1996: 47-91. 
9  %is, in part at least, explains also Matoš’s decision to pair his Emerson with Rousseau. 
While writing on Emerson, he quotes from Rousseau that it is in the country that we learn 
how to love and serve humanity – in cities, however, we learn only how to hate it (1973: 
42).
10  Hence Deleuze’s continued interest in Ka/a. Matoš, too, wrote also in German and 
published in Agramer Tagbla$, a Zagreb-based German newspaper.
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Also, it is the homogenizing uni#cation of the German lands that Nietzsche 
critiques in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” when he adopts Emerson’s descrip-
tion of revolutionary culture in order to argue that revolutionary culture is an 
alternative to the kind of subjectivity which is be#+ing the politics of homog-
enization. According to Emerson, “a new degree of culture would instantly 
revolutionize the entire system of human pursuits” (1950: 284).11 True, Ma-
toš too adopts Emerson as instruction, now for Croatia in Austria-Hungary. 
Still, while Matoš needs Emerson so as to suggest that Croatia is a pre-revo-
lutionary or perhaps a proto-revolutionary culture, Nietzsche employs Em-
erson in order to show that the homogenized Germany of the 1870s lost its 
revolutionary potential or, more precisely, to show that foregoing the revolu-
tionary potential was the price Germany paid for its homogenization.
If this is how Matoš provokes ultimately a comprehensive comparison 
of the American and the French Revolutions, what is truly provocative about 
his perspective is its implicit rejection of Nietzsche’s positions. Nietzsche, 
that is, seems to be implying that the Emersonian agenda is not universalist, 
insofar as not all can open up to revolutionary becoming; some respond to 
it by developing structures comparable to those which Freud will later de-
scribe as masochism. Matoš, on the other hand, registers no such restriction. 
Instead, he is emphatic about embracing Emerson’s idea of politics as educa-
tion, as if suggesting that crisis implicit in it is also how to think universalism. 
It is almost as if Matoš suggests that Nietzsche needs to be sidestepped if one 
is to understand America (and Emerson), as well as the event of the revolu-
tion where revolution is de#nitive to politics in modernity. Which is where 
another discussion can begin, and in the same vein: that of Derrida’s rejection 
of Je&erson in favor of Nietzsche, in his famous refusal to address the Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence except in the form of an excuse.12 
11  In Nietzsche: “Ein neuer Grad der Kultur würde augenblicklich das ganze System menschli-
cher Bestrebungen einer Umwälzung unterwerfen” (1988: 426, emphasis F. N.). Cavell pays 
special a+ention to this quote from Emerson in Nietzsche when discussing what he calls 
“the constitution of Emersonian perfectionism.” See Cavell 1988: 10.
12  See Derrida 1986.
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